I joined Yale School of Management in 2009 after completing my PhD at MIT. My research interests include industrial organization, economic theory, and energy/environmental economics. I teach Competitive Strategy and Energy Market Strategy.
Several of my papers apply random graph techniques to study applications of social networks in economics. One paper develops a model of demand for a product when consumers engage in word of mouth communication through a social network. Within this model I consider the optimal pricing and advertising strategies for a monopolist firm. A second paper studies the micro and macro characteristics of social networks when individuals, motivated by establishing trust with their friends, strategically influence with whom they become friends. A third paper considers the incentives for individuals to engage in word of mouth communication. It shows that a firm will optimally restrict access for some consumers to information their product and their ability to communicate about it. Also advertising will tend to crowd out the incentives for people to engage in word of mouth and thus a commitment by the firm not to undertake advertising is valuable. A fourth paper shows that as information is diffusing through a population then the optimal dynamic sequence of prices exhibits a pattern of sales.
Another paper in the area of organizational economics looks at decision making in teams when individuals must be motivated to acquire and share information in a timely manner. Here, my coauthors and I find that an individual's ability to hide information from other members of a team may help overcome free-riding problems and that there exists an optimal finite deadline which maximizes agents' welfare.
My work in energy/environmental economics compares theoretically and empirically, the effects of different government policies for investment in intermittent electricity generating technologies such as wind and solar power.