Barry NalebuffMilton Steinbach Professor of Management
Yale School of Management
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
(203) 432-5968
barry.nalebuff@yale.edu

 

 

 

 

BooksArticlesPuzzlesWorking PapersHonest Tea
Download complete CV as a .pdf

 

Books

Mission in a Bottle: The Honest Guide to Doing Business Differently—and Succeeding, New York: Random House, 2013 (with Seth Goldman). Translations in Japanese and Korean. See www.missioninabottle.net.

Lifecycle Investing: A New, Safe, and Audacious Way to Improve The Performance of Your Retirement Portfolio, New York: Basic, 2010 (with Ian Ayres). See www.lifecycleinvesting.net.

The Art of Strategy: A Game Theorist’s Guide to Success in Business and Life, New York: W.W. Norton, 2008 (with Avinash Dixit). Translations in Chinese, Italian, Japanese, Korean, and Spanish. See www.artofstrategy.net.

Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph Stiglitz, Richard Arnott, Bruce Greenwald, Ravi Kanbur, Barry Nalebuff (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003.

Why Not? How to Use Everyday Ingenuity to Solve Problems Big and Small, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2003 (with Ian Ayres). Translations in Bulgarian, Chinese, Estonian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Thai, and Vietnamese. See www.whynot.net.

Co-opetition, New York: Currency/Doubleday, 1996 (with Adam Brandenburger). Translations in Bahasa, Chinese, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish, and Vietnamese. See http://mayet.som.yale.edu/coopetition.

Thinking Strategically: A Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life, New York: W.W. Norton, 1991 (with Avinash Dixit). Translations in Chinese, German, Hebrew, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish, Turkish, and Vietnamese.

 

Articles

“The Rule of Probabilities,” Stanford Law Review, June 2015 (with Ian Ayres).

“Diversification Across Time,” Journal of Portfolio Management, Winter 2013 (with Ian Ayres).

“Price Discrimination and Welfare,” Competition Policy International 5, no. 2 (2009): 221–241.

“Home Equity Insurance: A Pilot Project,” in Housing Markets and the Economy: Risk, Regulation, and Policy, edited by E. Glaeser and J. Quigley, 39–82. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2009 (with Andrew Caplin, et al.)

“Unfit to Be Tied: An Analysis of Trident v. Independent Ink (2006),” in The Antitrust Revolution, 5th edition, edited by J. Kwoka and L. White, 365–88. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

“Bundling and Antitrust,” in Issues in Competition Law and Policy, edited by D. Collins, 1881–1910. Washington, DC: ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2008.

“Bundling and Tying,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, edited by S. Durlauf and L. Blume. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Supreme Court Amici Curiae in support of Independent Ink, Inc. in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 2005 (with Ian Ayres and Lawrence Sullivan).

“Exclusionary Bundling,” The Antitrust Bulletin 50, no. 3 (2005): 321–370.

“Going Soft on Microsoft? The EU's Antitrust Case and Remedy,” The Economists’ Voice 2, no. 2 (2005): Article 4.

“Tried and True Exclusion,” Competition Policy International 1, no. 1 (2005): 41–53.

“Encouraging Suggestive Behavior,” Harvard Business Review, December 2004 (with Ian Ayres).

“Product Bundling in Communications Markets,” a discussion with M. Del Blanco, R. Zastrow, and M. Lawrence-Apfelbaum. The Antitrust Source, November 2004.

“Negotiating the Deal” (with F. George Davitt) in Selling Your Business: The Transition from Entrepreneur to Investor, edited by L. Crosier, 55–80. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004.

“Principled Problem Solving: Letting Constraints Filter and Guide Your Thinking Can Often Be the Best Way to Reach Truly Creative Solutions,” Scientific American Mind 96 (2004) (with Ian Ayres).

“Verifying the Solution from a Nonlinear Solver: A Case Study: Comment,” American Economic Review 94, no. 1 (2004): 382–90 (with Ron Shachar).

“Bundling as an Entry Barrier,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 1 (2004): 159–188.

“In Praise of Honest Pricing,” MIT Sloan Management Review 45, no. 1 (2003): 24 (with Ian Ayres).

“Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects – Conceptual Issues,” DTI Economics Paper No. 1, 2003.

“Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects – Case Studies Issues,” DTI Economics Paper No. 1, 2003.

“Bundling: GE-Honeywell (2001),” in The Antitrust Revolution, 4th edition, edited by J. Kwoka and L. White, 388–412. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Also in 5th edition, 2009, 416–440.

“The Strategy of Bundling” in The Many Facets of Leadership, edited by M. Goldsmith, 293–301. New York: FT Prentice Hall, 2003.

“Thin Kin Gout, Oft’ He Box” (with Ian Ayres) in Leading Authorities on Business: Winning Strategies from the Greatest Minds, edited by M. Goldsmith and J. Belasco, 195–201. Washington, DC: Leading Authorities Press, 2002.

“The Prisoners' Dilemma,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, edited by P. Newman. New York: St Martin's Press, 2001.

“Competing Against Bundles,” in Incentives, Organization, and Public Economics, edited by P. Hammond and G. Myles. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

“Follow the Leader: A Pivotal Voter Theory,” American Economic Review 89, no. 3 (1999): 525–547 (with Ron Shachar).

“Comment on ‘Incentive Reforms in Developing Country Bureaucracies: Lessons from Tax Administration,’ by Dilip Mookherjee,” in Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1997, edited by B. Pleskovic and J. Stiglitz, 126–131. The World Bank, 1998.

“Common Knowledge as a Barrier to Negotiation,” UCLA Law Review, August 1997, 1631–59 (with Ian Ayres).

“Competition Among Institutions,” Journal of Economic Theory 72, no. 1 (1997): 306–342 (with Andrew Caplin).

“On a Clear Day You Can See the Coase Theorem,” in The Environment and Emerging Development Issues, Vol. 1, edited by P. Dasgupta and K. Mäler, 35–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

“Inside Intel,” Harvard Business Review, November–December 1996, 168–175 (with Adam Brandenburger).

“The Rationally Shrinking Union,” Economics and Politics 8, no. 1 (1996): 51–60 (with Richard Sansing).

“The Right Game: Use Game Theory to Shape Strategy,” Harvard Business Review 73, no. 4 (1995): 57–71 (with Adam Brandenburger). Reprinted in Seeing Differently: Insights on Innovation, edited by J. S. Brown. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997.

“An Introduction to Vote Counting Schemes,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no. 1 (1995): 3–26 (with Jonathan Levin). Reprinted in Readings in Microeconomic Theory, edited by M La Manna. London: The Dryden Press, 1997.

“Game Theory” (with A. Dixit), and “Prisoners' Dilemma” (with A. Dixit), in Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics, edited by D. Henderson. New York: Warner Books, 1993.

“To the Raider Goes the Surplus? A Reexamination of the Free-Rider Problem,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1, no.1 (1992): 37–62 (with Bengt Holmstrom).

“Individuals and Institutions,” American Economic Review 82, no. 2 (1992): 317–22 (with Andrew Caplin).

“Conservatism and Auditor-Client Negotiations,” Journal of Accounting Research 29, Supplement (1991): 31–54 (with Rick Antle).

“Making Strategies Credible” (with A. Dixit) in Strategic Reflections on Human Behavior, edited by R. Zeckhauser, 161–184. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.

“Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World,” World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991): 313–335.

“Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium,” Econometrica 59, no. 1 (1991): 25–60 (with Andrew Caplin).

“Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem,” Econometrica 59, no. 1 (1991): 1–24 (with Andrew Caplin).

“The Commitment to Seniority in Self-Governing Groups,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6, Special Issue (1990): 45–72 (with Kenneth Shepsle).

“Excess Capacity, Efficiency, and Industrial Policy,” in Managing Excess Capacity, edited by C. Baden-Fuller, 45–58. London: Basil Blackwell, 1990 (with Pankaj Ghemawat).

“The Devolution of Declining Industries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, no. 1 (1990): 167–186 (with Pankaj Ghemawat).

“Minimal Nuclear Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no. 3 (1988): 411–425.

“Issues in the Application of Cost-Benefit Analysis to Energy Projects in Developing Countries,” Oxford Economic Papers 39 (1987): 190–122 (with Sudhir Anand). Reprinted in Prices, Quantities, and Expectations, edited by P.J.N. Sinclair. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

“On 64%-Majority Rule,” Econometrica 56, no. 4 (1988): 787–815, (with Andrew Caplin).

“Credible Pretrial Negotiation,” Rand Journal of Economics 18, no. 2 (1987): 198–210.

“Multi-Dimensional Product Differentiation and Price Competition,” Oxford Economic Papers 38, Supplement, (1986): 129–146 (with Andrew Caplin). Reprinted in Strategic Behaviour and Industrial Competition, edited by D. Morris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

“Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 9, no. 2 (1986): 19–30.

“Testing in Models of Asymmetric Information,” Review of Economic Studies 54, no. 2 (1987): 265–279 (with David Scharfstein).

“Pensions and the Retirement Decision” (with Richard Zeckhauser) in Pensions, Labor, and Individual Choice, edited by D. Wise, 283–316. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985.

“Exit,” Rand Journal of Economics 16, no. 2 (1985): 184–194 (with Pankaj Ghemawat).

“Asymmetric Equilibria in the War of Attrition,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 113 (1985): 517–527 (with John Riley).

“Dragon-Slaying and Ballroom Dancing: The Private Supply of a Public Good,” Journal of Public Economics 25 (1984): 1–12 (with Christopher Bliss).

“Some Aspects of Risk Sharing in Non-Classical Environments” (with Hal Varian) in Social Insurance, edited by L. Soderstrom, 1–19. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1983.

“Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition,” Bell Journal of Economics 14, no. 1 (1983): 21–43 (with Joseph Stiglitz).

“Information, Competition, and Markets,” American Economic Review 73, no. 2 (1983): 278–283 (with Joseph Stiglitz).

 

Puzzles

These puzzles appeared in the Journal of Economic Perspectives between 1987–1990.

“Queues, Coups, and More,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (2) Spring 1990.

“Slot Machines, Zomepirac, Squash, and More,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (1) Winter 1990.

“The Arbitrage Mirage, Wait Watchers, and More,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3 (3) Summer 1989.

“The Other Person’s Envelope is Always Greener,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3 (1) Winter 1989.

“Blockades, Carrier Missions, Secret Intelligence, and More,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2 (4) Fall 1988.

“Cider in Your Ear, Continuing Dilemma, The Last Shall be First, and More,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2 (2) Spring 1988.

“Penny Stocks, Discount Brokers, Better Bidding, and More,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2 (1) Winter 1988.

“Choose a Curtain, Duel-ity, Two Point Conversions, and More,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 (2) Fall 1987.

“Noisy Prisoners, Manhattan Locations, and More,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 (1) Summer 1987.

 

Working Papers

“Life-Cycle Investing and Leverage: Buying Stock on Margin Can Reduce Retirement Risk” (with Ian Ayres), NBER Working Paper No. W14094.

“Competing Complements” (with Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and David Yoffie), NET Institute Working Paper No. 07-44.

“One-Way Essential Complements” (with Keith Chen), Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1588; Yale Economic Applications and Policy Discussion Paper No. 22.

“Bundling as a Way to Leverage Monopoly,” Yale SOM Working Paper No. ES-36.

“Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Screening Device” (with Andrés Rodriguéz and Joseph Stiglitz), NBER Discussion paper #4357.

“On a Fundamental Conflict Between Equity and Efficiency” (with John Geanakoplos), Princeton University Discussion paper #137.

“Revenge and Rational Play” (with Martin Shubik), Princeton University Discussion paper #138.

“Prices and Qualities” (with Joseph Stiglitz), Princeton University Econometric Research program Discussion paper #297.

“The Ambiguous Antitrust Implications of Information Sharing” (with Richard Zeckhauser), Princeton University Discussion paper #106 (with Richard Zeckhauser).