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Q1 The Pipeline Project: Pre-Publication Independent Replications of a single
2 laboratory's research pipeline

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6 1

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90 The reproducibility of key findings distinguishes scientific studies
 91 from mere anecdotes. However, for reasons that are not yet fully under-
 92 stood, many, if not most, published studies across many scientific do-
 93 mains are not easily replicated by independent laboratories (Begley &
 94 Ellis, 2012; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Prinz,
 95 Schlange, & Asadullah, 2011). For example, an initiative by Bayer
 96 Healthcare to replicate 67 pre-clinical studies led to a reproducibility
 97 rate of 20–25% (Prinz et al., 2011), and researchers at Amgen were
 98 only able to replicate 6 of 53 influential cancer biology studies (Begley
 99 & Ellis, 2012). More recently, across a number of crowdsourced replica-
 100 tion initiatives in social psychology, the majority of independent
 101 replications failed to find the significant results obtained in the original
 102 report (Ebersole et al., in press; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science
 103 Collaboration, 2015).

104 The process of replicating published work can be adversarial
 105 (Bohannon, 2014; Gilbert, 2014; Kahneman, 2014; Schnall, 2014a/b/c;
 106 but see Matzke et al., 2015), with concerns raised that some replicators
 107 select findings from research areas in which they lack expertise and
 108 about which they hold skeptical priors (Lieberman, 2014; Wilson,
 109 2014). Some replications may have been conducted with insufficient
 110 pretesting and tailoring of study materials to the new subject popula-
 111 tion, or involve sensitive manipulations and measures that even experi-
 112 enced investigators find difficult to properly carry out (Mitchell, 2014;
 113 Schwarz & Strack, 2014; Stroebe & Strack, 2014). On the other side of
 114 the replication process, motivated reasoning (Ditto & Lopez, 1992;
 115 Kunda, 1990; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Molden & Higgins, 2012)
 116 and post-hoc dissonance (Festinger, 1957) may lead the original au-
 117 thors to dismiss evidence they would have accepted as disconfirmatory
 118 had it been available in the early stages of theoretical development
 119 (Mahoney, 1977; Nickerson, 1999; Schaller, in press; Tversky &
 120 Kahneman, 1971).

121 We introduce a complementary and more collaborative approach, in
 122 which findings are replicated in qualified independent laboratories be-
 123 fore (rather than after) they are published (see also Schooler, 2014).
 124 We illustrate the Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) ap-
 125 proach through a crowdsourced project in which 25 laboratories from
 126 around the world conducted replications of all 10 moral judgment ef-
 127 fects which the last author and his collaborators had “in the pipeline”
 128 as of August 2014.

A B S T R A C T

This crowdsourced project introduces a collaborative approach to improving the reproducibility of scientific re- 75
 search, in which findings are replicated in qualified independent laboratories before (rather than after) they are 76
 published. Our goal is to establish a non-adversarial replication process with highly informative final results. To 77
 illustrate the Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) approach, 25 research groups conducted replica- 78
 tions of all ten moral judgment effects which the last author and his collaborators had “in the pipeline” as of 79
 August 2014. Six findings replicated according to all replication criteria, one finding replicated but with a signif- 80
 icantly smaller effect size than the original, one finding replicated consistently in the original culture but not out- 81
 side of it, and two findings failed to find support. In total, 40% of the original findings failed at least one major 82
 replication criterion. Potential ways to implement and incentivize pre-publication independent replication on 83
 a large scale are discussed. 84

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Each of the 10 original studies from Uhlmann and collaborators ob- 129
 tained support for at least one major theoretical prediction. The studies 130
 used simple designs that called for ANOVA followed up by t-tests of 131
 simple effects for the experiments, and correlational analyses for the 132
 nonexperimental studies. Importantly, for all original studies, all condi- 133
 tions and outcomes related to the theoretical hypotheses were included 134
 in the analyses, and no participants were excluded. Furthermore, with 135
 the exception of two studies that were run before 2010, results were 136
 only analyzed after data collection had been terminated. In these two 137
 older studies (*intuitive economics effect* and *belief-act inconsistency* 138
effect), data were analyzed twice, once approximately halfway through 139
 data collection and then again after the termination of data collection. 140
 Thus, for most of the studies, a lack of replicability cannot be easily 141
 accounted for by exploitation of researcher degrees of freedom 142
 (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) in the original analyses. For 143
 the purposes of transparency, the data and materials from both the orig- 144
 inal and replication studies are posted on the Open Science Framework 145
 (<https://osf.io/q25xa/>), creating a publicly available resource re- 146
 searchers can use to better understand reproducibility and non- 147
 reproducibility in science (Kitchin, 2014; Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012; 148
 Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012). 149

In addition, as replicator labs were explicitly selected for their exper- 150
 tise and access to subject populations that were theoretically expected 151
 to exhibit the original effects, several of the most commonly given 152
 counter-explanations for failures to replicate are addressed by the 153
 present project. Under these conditions, a failure to replicate is more 154
 clearly attributable to the original study overestimating the relevant ef- 155
 fect size — either due to the “winner’s curse” suffered by underpowered 156
 studies that achieve significant results largely by chance (Button et al., 157
 2013; Ioannidis, 2005; Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007; Schooler, 2011) or 158
 due to unanticipated differences between participant populations, 159
 which would suggest that the phenomenon is less general than initially 160
 hypothesized (Schaller, in press). Because one replication team was lo- 161
 cated at the institution where four of the original studies were run 162
 (Northwestern University), and replication laboratories are spread 163
 across six countries (United States, Canada, The Netherlands, France, 164
 Germany and China) it is possible to empirically assess the extent to 165
 which declines in effect sizes between original and replication studies 166
 (Schooler, 2011) are due to unexpected yet potentially meaningful 167

168 cultural and population differences (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). For all of these reasons, this crowdsourced PPIR initiative features 169 replications arguably higher in informational value (Nelson, 2005; Nelson, McKenzie, Cottrell, & Sejnowski, 2010) than in prior 170 work. 171 172

173 1. Method

174 1.1. Selection of original findings and replication laboratories

175 Ten moral judgment studies were selected for replication. We defined 176 our sample of studies as all unpublished moral judgment effects the last author and his collaborators had “in the pipeline” as of August 177 2014. These moral judgment studies were ideal for a crowdsourced replication 178 project because the study scenarios and dependent measures were straightforward to administer, and did not involve sensitive manipulations of participants’ mindset or mood. They also examined 179 basic aspects of moral psychology such as character attributions, interpersonal trust, and fairness that were not expected to vary dramatically 180 between the available samples of research participants. All 10 original 181 studies found support for at least one key theoretical prediction. The crowdsourced PPIR project assessed whether support for the same prediction 182 was obtained by other research groups. 183 184 185 186 187

188 Unlike any previous large-scale replication project, all original findings 189 targeted for replication in the Pipeline Project were unpublished rather than published. In addition, all findings were volunteered by 190 the original authors, rather than selected by replicators from a set of prestigious journals in a given year (e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015) or nominated on a public website (e.g., Ebersole et al., in press). 191 In a further departure from previous replication initiatives, participation 192 in the Pipeline Project was by invitation-only, via individual recruitment e-mails. This ensured that participating laboratories had both adequate 193 expertise and access to a subject population in which the original finding was theoretically expected to replicate using the original materials (i.e., without any need for further pre-testing or revisions to the 194 manipulations, scenarios, or dependent variables; Schwarz & Strack, 2014; Stroebe & Strack, 2014). Thus, the PPIR project did not repeat 195 the original studies in new locations without regard for context. Indeed, 196 replication labs and locations were selected a priori by the original authors as appropriate to test the effect of interest. 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204

205 1.2. Data collection process

206 Each independent laboratory conducted a direct replication of 207 between three and ten of the targeted studies ($M_{\text{studies}} = 5.64$, $SD = 1.24$), using the materials developed by the original researchers. To reduce 208 participant fatigue, studies were typically administered using a computerized script in one of three packets, each containing three to 209 four studies, with study-order counterbalanced between-subjects. 210 There were four noteworthy exceptions to this approach. First, the Northwestern University replications were conducted using paper-pencil 211 questionnaires, and participants were randomly assigned to complete a packet including either one longer study or three shorter studies 212 in a fixed rather than counterbalanced order. Second, the Yale University replications omitted one study from one packet out of investigator 213 concerns that the participant population might find the moral judgment scenario offensive. Third, the INSEAD Paris lab data collections included 214 a translation error in one study that required it to be re-run separately from the others. Fourth and finally, the HEC Paris replication pack 215 included six studies in a fixed order. Tables S1a–S1f in Supplement 1 summarize the replication locations, specific studies replicated, sample 216 sizes, mode of study administration (online vs. laboratory), and type of subject population (general population, MBA students, graduate 217 students, or undergraduate students) for each replication packet. 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226

227 Replication packets were translated from English into the local language (e.g., Chinese, French) with the exception of the HEC Paris

228 and Groningen data collections, where the materials were in English, 229 as participants were enrolled in classes delivered in English. All translations 230 were checked for accuracy by at least two native language speakers. The complete Qualtrics links for the replication packets are 231 available at <https://osf.io/q25xa/>. 232 233

234 We used a similar data collection process to the Many Labs initiatives (Klein et al., 2014; Ebersole et al., in press). The studies were programmed 235 and carefully error-checked by the project coordinators, who then distributed individual links to each replication team. Each 236 participant’s data was sent to a centralized Qualtrics account as they completed the study. After the data were collected, the files were compiled 237 by the project’s first and second author and uploaded to the Open Science Framework. We could not have replication teams upload their 238 data directly to the OSF because it had to be carefully anonymized first. The Pipeline Project website on the OSF includes three master 239 files, one for each pipeline packet, with the data from all the replication studies together. The data for the original studies is likewise posted, also 240 in an anonymized format. 241 242 243 244 245 246

247 Replication teams were asked to collect 100 participants or more for at least one packet of replication studies. Although some of the individual 248 replication studies had less than 80% power to detect an effect of the same size as the original study, aggregating samples across locations of 249 our studies fulfilled Simonsohn’s (2015) suggestion that replications should have at least 2.5 times as many participants as the original 250 study. The largest-N original study collected data for 265 subjects; the aggregated replication samples for each finding range from 1542 participants 251 to 3647 participants. Thus, the crowdsourced project allowed for high-powered tests of the original hypotheses and more accurate effect 252 size estimates than the original data collections. 253 254 255 256 257

258 1.3. Specific findings targeted for replication

259 Although the principal goal of the present article is to introduce the PPIR method and demonstrate its feasibility and effectiveness, each of 260 the ten original effects targeted for replication are of theoretical interest in-and-of themselves. Detailed write-ups of the methods and results for 261 each original study are provided in Supplement 2, and the complete replication materials are included in Supplement 3. 262 263 264

265 The bulk of the studies test core predictions of the person-centered account of moral judgment (Landy & Uhlmann, 2015; Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Uhlmann, 2012; Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). Two further studies 266 explore the effects of moral concerns on perceptions of economic processes, with an eye toward better understanding public opposition 267 to aspects of the free market system (Blendon et al., 1997; Caplan, 2001, 2002). A final pair of studies examines the implications 268 of the psychology of moral judgment for corporate reputation management (Diermeier, 2011). 269 270 271 272 273 274

275 1.3.1. Person-centered morality

276 The person-centered account of moral judgment posits that moral evaluations are frequently driven by informational value regarding 277 personal character rather than the harmfulness and blameworthiness of acts. As a result, less harmful acts can elicit more negative moral judgments, 278 as long as they are more informative about personal character. Further, *act-person dissociations* can emerge, in which acts that are 279 rated as less blameworthy than other acts nonetheless send clearer signals of poor character (Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011; Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum, 2013). More broadly, the person-centered 280 approach is consistent with research showing that internal factors, such as intentions, can be weighed more heavily in moral judgments 281 than objective external consequences. The first six studies targeted for replication in the Pipeline Project test ideas at the heart of 282 the theory, and further represent the body of unpublished work from this research program. Large-sample failures to replicate many or 283 most of these findings across 25 universities would at a minimum 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291

severely undermine the theory, and perhaps even invalidate it entirely. Brief descriptions of each of the person-centered morality studies are provided below.

Study 1: Bigot–misanthrope effect. Participants judge a manager who selectively mistreats racial minorities as a more blameworthy person than a manager who mistreats all of his employees. This supports the hypothesis that the informational value regarding character provided by patterns of behavior plays a more important role in moral judgments than aggregating harmful vs. helpful acts (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Shweder & Haidt, 1993; Yuill, Perner, Pearson, Peerbhoy, & Ende, 1996).

Study 2: Cold-hearted prosociality effect. A medical researcher who does experiments on animals is seen as engaging in more morally praiseworthy acts than a pet groomer, but also as a worse person. This effect emerges even in joint evaluation (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999), with the two targets evaluated at the same time. Such *act–person dissociations* demonstrate that moral evaluations of acts and the agents who carry them out can diverge in systematic and predictable ways. They represent the most unique prediction of, and therefore strongest evidence for, the person centered approach to moral judgment.

Study 3: Bad tipper effect. A person who leaves the full tip entirely in pennies is judged more negatively than a person who leaves less money in bills, and tipping in pennies is seen as higher in informational value regarding character. Like the bigot–misanthrope effect described above, this provides rare direct evidence of the role of perceived informational value regarding character in moral judgments. Moral reactions often track perceived character deficits rather than harmful consequences (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Yuill et al., 1996).

Study 4: Belief–act inconsistency effect. An animal rights activist who is caught hunting is seen as an untrustworthy and bad person, even by participants who think hunting is morally acceptable. This reflects person centered morality: an act seen as morally permissible in-and-of-itself nonetheless provokes moral opprobrium due to its inconsistency with the agent’s stated beliefs (Monin & Merritt, 2012; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007).

Study 5: Moral inversion effect. A company that contributes to charity but then spends even more money promoting the contribution in advertisements not only nullifies its generous deed, but is perceived even more negatively than a company that makes no donation at all. Thus, even an objectively helpful act can provoke moral condemnation, so long as it suggests negative underlying traits such as insincerity (Jordan, Diermeier, & Galinsky, 2012).

Study 6: Moral cliff effect. A company that airbrushes the model in their skin cream advertisement to make her skin look perfect is seen as more dishonest, ill-intentioned, and deserving of punishment than a company that hires a model whose skin already looks perfect. This theoretically reflects inferences about underlying intentions and traits (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Yuill et al., 1996). In the two cases consumers have been equally misled by a perfect-looking model, but in the airbrushing case the deception seems more deliberate and explicitly dishonest.

1.3.2. Morality and markets

Studies 7 and 8 examined the role of moral considerations in lay perceptions of capitalism and businesspeople, in an effort to better understand discrepancies between the policy prescriptions of economists and everyday people (Blendon et al., 1997; Caplan, 2001, 2002). Despite the material wealth created by free markets, moral intuitions lead to deep psychological unease with the inequality and incentive structures of capitalism. Understanding such intuitions is critical to bridging the gap between lay and scientific understandings of economic processes.

Study 7: Intuitive economics effect. Economic variables that are widely regarded as unfair are perceived as especially bad for the economy. Such a correlation raises the possibility that moral concerns about fairness irrationally influence perceptions of economic processes. In other

words, aspects of free markets that seem unfair on moral grounds (e.g., replacing hard-working factory workers with automated machinery that can do the job more cheaply) may be subject to distorted perceptions of their objective economic effects (a moral coherence effect; Clark, Chen, & Ditto, in press; Liu & Ditto, 2013).

Study 8: Burn-in-hell effect. Participants perceive corporate executives as more likely to burn in hell than members of social categories defined by antisocial behavior, such as vandals. This of course reflects incredibly negative assumptions about senior business leaders. “Vandals” is a social category defined by bad behavior; “corporate executive” is simply an organizational role. However, the *assumed* behaviors of a corporate executive appear negative enough to warrant moral censure.

1.3.3. Reputation management

The final two studies examined how prior assumptions and beliefs can shape moral judgments of organizations faced with a reputational crisis. Corporate leaders may frequently fail to anticipate the negative assumptions everyday people have about businesses, or the types of moral standards that are applied to different types of organizations. These issues hold important applied implications, given the often devastating economic consequences of psychologically misinformed reputation management (Diermeier, 2011).

Study 9: Presumption of guilt effect. For a company, failing to respond to accusations of misconduct leads to similar judgments as being investigated and found guilty. If companies accused of wrongdoing are simply assumed to be guilty until proven otherwise, this means that aggressive reputation management during a corporate crisis is imperative. Inaction or “no comment” responses to public accusations may be in effect an admission of guilt (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Pace, Fediuk, & Botero, 2010).

Study 10: Higher standard effect. It is perceived as acceptable for a private company to give small (but not large) perks to its top executive. But for the leader of a charitable organization, even a small perk is seen as moral transgression. Thus, under some conditions a praiseworthy reputation and laudable goals can actually hurt an organization, by leading it to be held to a higher moral standard.

The original data collections found empirical support for each of the ten effects described above. These studies possessed many of the same strengths and weaknesses found in the typical published research in social psychology journals. On the positive side, the original studies featured hypotheses strongly grounded in prior theory, and research designs that allowed for excellent experimental control (and for the experimental designs, causal inferences). On the negative side, the original studies had only modest sample sizes and relied on participants from one subpopulation of a single country. The Pipeline Project assessed how many of these findings would emerge as robust in large-sample crowdsourced replications at universities across the world.

1.4. Pre-registered analysis plan

The pre-registration documents for our analyses are posted on the Open Science Framework (<https://osf.io/uivsj/>), and are also included in Supplement 4. The HEC Paris replications were conducted prior to the pre-registration of the analyses for the project; all of the other replications can be considered pre-registered (Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012). None of the original studies were pre-registered.

Pre-registration is a new method in social psychology (Nosek & Lakens, 2014; Wagenmakers et al., 2012), and there is currently no fixed standard of practice. It is generally acknowledged that, when feasible, registering a plan for how the data will be analyzed in advance is a good research practice that increases confidence in the reported findings. As with prior crowdsourced replication projects (Ebersole et al., in press; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015), the present report focuses on the primary effect of interest from each

original study. Our pre-registration documents therefore list 1) the replication criteria that will be applied to the original findings and 2) the specific comparisons used to calculate the replication effect sizes (i.e., for each study, which condition will be compared to which condition and what the key dependent measure is). This method provides few researcher degrees of freedom (Simmons et al., 2011) to exaggerate the replicability of the original findings.

2. Results

2.1. Data exclusion policy

None of the original studies targeted for replication dropped observations, and to be consistent none of the replication studies did either. It is true in principle that excluding data is sometimes justified and can lead to more accurate inferences (Berinsky, Margolis, & Sances, in press; Curran, in press). However, in practice this is often done in the post-hoc manner and exploits researcher degrees of freedom to produce false positive findings (Simmons et al., 2011). Excluding observations is most justified in the case of research highly subject to noisy data, such as research on reaction times for instance (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). The present studies almost exclusively used simple moral judgment scenarios and self-report Likert-type scale responses for dependent measures. Our policy was therefore to not remove any participants from the analyses of the replication results, and dropping observations was not part of the pre-registered analysis plan for the project. The data from the Pipeline Project is publicly posted on the Open Science Framework website, and anyone interested can re-analyze the data using participant exclusions if they wish to do so.

2.2. Original and replication effect sizes

The original effect sizes, meta-analyzed replication effect sizes, and effect sizes for each individual replication are shown in Fig. 1. To obtain the displayed effect sizes, a standardized mean difference (d , Cohen, 1988) was computed for each study and each sample taking the difference between the means of the two sets of scores and dividing it by the sample standard deviation (for uncorrelated means) or by the standard deviation of the difference scores (for dependent means). Effect sizes for each study were then combined according to a random effects model, weighting every single effect for the inverse of its total variance (i.e. the sum of the between- and within-study variances) (Cochran & Carroll, 1953; Lipsey &

Wilson, 2001). The variances of the combined effects were computed as the reciprocal of the sum of the weights and the standard error of the combined effect sizes as the squared root of the variance, and 95% confidence intervals were computed by adding to and subtracting from the combined effect 1.96 standard errors. Formulas for the calculation of meta-analytic means, variances, SEs, and CIs were taken from Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, and Rothstein (2011) and from Cooper and Hedges (1994).

In Fig. 1 and in the present report more generally our focus is on the replicability of the single most theoretically important result from each original study (Ebersole et al., in press; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). However, Supplement 2 more comprehensively repeats the analyses from each original study, with the replication results appearing in brackets in red font immediately after the same statistical test from the original investigation.

2.3. Applying frequentist replication criteria

There is currently no single, fixed standard to evaluate replication results, and as outlined in our pre-registration plan we therefore applied five primary criteria to determine whether the replications successfully reproduced the original findings (Brandt et al., 2014; Simonsohn, 2015). These included whether 1) the original and replication effects were in the same direction, 2) the replication effect was statistically significant after meta-analyzing across all replications, 3) meta-analyzing the original and replication effects resulted in a significant effect, 4) the original effect was inside the confidence interval of the meta-analyzed replication effect size, and 5) the replication effect size was large enough to have been reliably detected in the original study ("small telescopes" criterion; Simonsohn, 2015). Table 1 evaluates the replication results for each study along the five dimensions, as well as providing a more holistic evaluation in the final column.

The small telescopes criterion perhaps requires some further explanation. A large- N replication can yield an effect size significantly different from zero that still fails the small telescopes criterion, in that the "true" (i.e., replication) effect is too small to have been reliably detected in the original study. This suggests that although the results of the original study could just have been due to statistical noise, the original authors did correctly predict the direction of the true effect from their theoretical reasoning (see also Hales, in press). Figure S5 in Supplement 5 summarizes the small telescopes results, including each original effect size, the corresponding aggregated replication effect




Fig. 1. Original effect sizes (indicated with an X), individual effect sizes for each replication sample (small circles), and meta-analyzed replication effect sizes (large circles). Error bars reflect the 95% confidence interval around the meta-analyzed replication effect size. Note the "Higher Standard" study featured two effects, one of which was originally significant (effect of awarding a small perk to the head of a charity) and one of which was originally a null effect (effect of awarding a small perk to a corporate executive). Note also that the Presumption of Guilt effect was a null finding in the original study (no difference between failure to respond to accusations of wrongdoing and being found guilty).

Table 1
Assessment of replication results.

Effect	Description of original finding	Original and replication effect in same direction	Replication effect significant	Effect significant meta-analyzing the replications and the original study	Original effect inside CI of replication	Small telescopes criterion passed	Overall assessment of replicability
Moral inversion	A company that contributes to charity but then spends even more money promoting the contribution is perceived more negatively than a company that makes no donation at all.	Yes	Yes	Yes	No (rep. < original)	Yes	Successful replication overall. The effect in the replication is smaller than in the original study, but it passes the small telescopes criterion.
Bad tipper	A person who leaves the full tip entirely in pennies is judged more negatively than a person who leaves less money in bills.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Replicated robustly in USA with variable results outside the USA.
Belief-act inconsistency	An animal rights activist who is caught hunting is seen as more immoral than a big game hunter.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Successful replication
Moral cliff	A company that airbrushes their model to make her skin look perfect is seen as more dishonest than a company that hires a model whose skin already looks perfect.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Successful replication
Cold hearted prosociality	A medical researcher who does experiments on animals is seen as engaging in more morally praiseworthy acts than a pet groomer, but also as a worse person	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Successful replication
Burn in hell	Corporate executives are seen as more likely to burn in hell than vandals.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Successful replication
Bigot-misanthrope	Participants judge a manager who selectively mistreats racial minorities as a more blameworthy person than a manager who mistreats everyone.	Yes	Yes	Yes	No (rep. > original)	Yes	Successful replication
Presumption of guilt	For a company, failing to respond to accusations of misconduct leads to judgments as harsh as being found guilty.	Yes	Yes (original was a null effect)	Yes (original was a null effect)	No (rep. > original)	N/A	Failure to replicate. Original effect was a null effect with a tiny point difference, such that failing to respond to accusations of wrongdoing is just as bad as being investigated and found guilty. However in the replication failing to respond is unexpectedly significantly worse than being found guilty, with an effect size over five times as large as in the original study. This cannot be explained by a presumption of guilt as in the original theory.
Intuitive economics	The extent to which people think high taxes are fair is positively correlated with the extent to which they think high taxes are good for the economy.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Successful replication
Higher standards: company condition	It is perceived as acceptable for the top executive at a corporation to receive a small perk.	Yes	Yes (original was a null effect)	Yes (original was a null effect)	No (rep. > original)	N/A	Failure to replicate. The original study found that a small executive perk hurt the reputation of the head of a charity (significant effect) but not a company (null effect). In the replication a small perk hurt both types of executives to
Higher standards: charity condition	For the leader of a charitable organization, receiving a small perk is seen as moral transgression.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	the replication a small perk hurt both types of executives to an equal degree. The effect of a small perk in the company condition is over two times as large in the replication

as in
the original study. There is no evidence in the
replication
that the head of a charity is held to a higher standard.

size, and d33% line indicating the smallest effect size that would be reasonably detectable with the original study design.

Interpreting the replication results is slightly more complicated for the two original findings which involved null effects (*presumption of guilt effect* and *higher standard effect*). The original presumption of guilt study found that failing to respond to accusations of wrongdoing is perceived equally negatively as being investigated and found guilty. The original higher standard study predicted and found that receiving a small perk (as opposed to purely monetary compensation) negatively affected the reputation of the head of a charity (significant effect), but not a corporate executive (null effect), consistent with the idea that charitable organizations are held to a higher standard than for-profit companies. For these two studies, a failure to replicate would involve a significant effect emerging where there had not been one before, or a replication effect size significantly larger than the original null effect. The more holistic evaluation of replicability in the final column of Table 1 takes these nuances into account.

Meta-analyzed replication effects for all studies were in the same direction as the original effect (see Table 1). In eight out of ten studies, effects that were significant or nonsignificant in the original study were likewise significant or nonsignificant in the crowdsourced replication (eight of eight effects that were significant in the original study were also significant in the replication; neither of the two original findings that were null effects in the original study were also null effects in the replication). Including the original effect size in the meta-analysis did not change these results, due to the much larger total sample of the crowdsourced replications. For four out of ten studies, the confidence interval of the meta-analyzed replication effect did not include the original effect; in one case, this occurred because the replication effect was smaller than the original effect. No study failed the small telescopes criterion.

2.4. Applying a Bayesian replication criterion

Replication results can also be evaluated using Bayesian methods (e.g., Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014; Wagenmakers, Verhagen & Ly, in press). Here we focus on the Bayes factor, a continuous measure of evidence that quantifies the degree to which the observed data are predicted better by the alternative hypothesis than by the null hypothesis (e.g., Jeffreys, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009; Wagenmakers, Grünwald, & Steyvers, 2006). The Bayes factor requires that the alternative hypothesis is able to make predictions, and this necessitates that its parameters are assigned specific values. In the Bayesian framework, the uncertainty associated with these values is described through a prior probability distribution. For instance, the default correlation test features an alternative hypothesis that stipulates all values of the population correlation coefficient to be equally likely a priori – this is instantiated by a uniform prior distribution that ranges from -1 to 1 (Jeffreys, 1961; Ly, Verhagen & Wagenmakers, in press). Another example is the default t-test, which features an alternative hypothesis that assigns a fat-tailed prior distribution to effect size (i.e., a Cauchy distribution with scale $r = 1$; for details see Jeffreys, 1961; Ly et al., in press; Rouder et al., 2009).

In a first analysis, we applied the default Bayes factor hypothesis tests to the original findings. The results are shown on the y-axis of Fig. 2. For instance, the original experiment on the *moral inversion effect* yielded $BF_{10} = 7.526$, meaning that the original data are about 7.5 times more likely under the default alternative hypothesis than under the null hypothesis. For 9 out of 11 effects, $BF_{10} > 1$, indicating evidence in favor of the default alternative hypothesis. This evidence was particularly compelling for the following five effects: the *moral cliff effect*, the *cold hearted prosociality effect*, the *bigot-misanthrope effect*, the *intuitive economics effect*, and – albeit to a lesser degree – the *higher standards-charity effect*. The evidence was less conclusive for the *moral inversion effect*, the *bad tipper effect*, and the *burn in hell effect*; for the *belief-act inconsistency effect*, the evidence is almost perfectly ambiguous (i.e., $BF_{10} = 1.119$). In

contrast, and as predicted by the theory, the Bayes factor indicates support in favor of the null hypothesis for the *presumption of guilt effect* (i.e., $BF_{01} = 5.604$; note the switch in subscripts: the data are about 5.6 times more likely under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis). Finally, for the *higher standards-company effect* the Bayes factor does signal support in favor of the null hypothesis – as predicted by the theory – but only by a narrow margin (i.e., $BF_{01} = 1.781$).

In a second analysis, we take advantage of the fact that Bayesian inference is, at its core, a theory of optimal learning. Specifically, in order to gauge replication success we calculate Bayes factors separately for each replication study; however, we now depart from the default specification of the alternative hypothesis and instead use a highly informed prior distribution, namely the posterior distribution from the original experiment. This informed alternative hypothesis captures the belief of a rational agent who has seen the original experiment and believes the alternative hypothesis to be true. In other words, our replication Bayes factors contrast the predictive adequacy of two hypotheses: the standard null hypothesis that corresponds to the belief of a skeptic and an informed alternative hypothesis that corresponds to the idealized belief of a proponent (Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014; Wagenmakers et al., in press).

The replication Bayes factors are denoted by BF_{r0} and are displayed by the gray dots in Fig. 2. Most informed alternative hypotheses received overwhelming support, as indicated by very high values of BF_{r0} . From a Bayesian perspective, the original effects therefore generally replicated with a few exceptions. First, the replication Bayes factors favor the informed alternative hypothesis for the *higher standards-company effect*, when the original was a null finding. Second, the evidence is neither conclusively for nor against the *presumption of guilt effect*, which was also originally a null finding. The data and output for the Bayesian assessments of the original and replication results are available on the Pipeline Project's OSF page: <https://osf.io/q25xa/>.

2.5. Moderator analyses

Table 2 summarizes whether a number of sample characteristics and methodological variables significantly moderated the replication effect sizes for each original finding targeted for replication. Supplement 6 provides more details on our moderator analyses.

2.5.1. USA vs. non-USA sample

As noted earlier, no cultural differences for any of the original findings were hypothesized a priori. In fact replication laboratories were chosen for the PPIR initiative due to their access to subject populations in which the original effect was theoretically predicted to emerge. However, it is, of course, an empirical question whether the effects vary across cultures or not. Since all of the original studies were conducted in the United States, we examined whether replication location (USA vs. non-USA) made a difference. As seen in Table 2, six out of ten original findings exhibited significantly larger effect sizes in replications in the United States, whereas the reverse was true for one original effect.

Results for one original finding, the *bad tipper effect*, were especially variable across cultures ($Q(16) = 165.39, p < .001$). The percentage of variability between studies that is due to heterogeneity rather than chance (random sampling) is $I^2 = 90.32\%$ in the bad tipper effect and 68.11% on average in all other effects studied. The *bad tipper effect* is the only study in which non-US samples account for approximately a half of the total true heterogeneity. The drop in I^2 that we observed when we removed non-USA samples from the other studies was 10.78% on average. The bad tipper effect replicated consistently in the United States ($d_{usa} = 0.74, 95\% \text{ CI } [.62, .87]$), but less so outside the USA ($d_{non-USA} = 0.30, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.22, .82]$)¹; the difference between these two effect sizes was significant, $F(1,3635) = 52.59, p = .01$. The bad tipper effect actually significantly reversed in the replication from The Netherlands ($d_{netherlands} = -0.46, p < .01$). Although post hoc one potential explanation could be cultural differences in tipping




Fig. 2. Bayesian inference for the Pipeline Project effects. The y-axis lists each effect and the Bayes factor in favor of or against the default alternative hypothesis for the data from the original study (i.e., BF_{10} and BF_{01} , respectively). The x-axis shows the values for the replication Bayes factor where prior distribution under the alternative hypothesis equals the posterior distribution from the original study (i.e., BF_{r0}). For most effects, the replication Bayes factors indicate overwhelming evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis; hence, the bottom panel provides an enlarged view of a restricted scale. See text for details.

norms (Azar, 2007). Regardless of the underlying reasons, these analyses provide initial evidence of cultural variability in the replication results.

2.5.2. Same vs. different location as original study

To our knowledge, the Pipeline Project is the only crowdsourced replication initiative to systematically re-run all of the targeted studies using the original subject population. For instance, four studies conducted between 2007 and 2010 using Northwestern undergraduates as participants were replicated in 2015 as part of the project, again using Northwestern undergraduates. We reran our analyses of key effects and included study location as a moderating variable (different location as original study = coded as 0; same location as original study = coded as 1). This allowed us to examine whether findings were more likely to replicate in the original population than in new populations. As seen in Table 2, five effects were significantly larger in the original location, two effects were actually significantly larger in locations *other than* the original study site, and for four effects same versus different location was not a significant moderator.

2.5.3. Student sample vs. general population

The type of subject population was likewise examined. A general criticism of psychological research is its over-reliance on undergraduate student samples, arguably limiting the generalizability of research findings (Sears, 1986). As seen in Table 2, five effects were larger in the general population than in student samples, whereas the reverse was true for one effect.

2.5.4. Study order

As subject fatigue may create noise and reduce estimated effect sizes, we examined whether the order in which the study appeared made a difference. It seemed likely that studies would be more likely to replicate when administered earlier in the replication packet. However, order only significantly moderated replication effect sizes for one finding, which was unexpectedly larger when included *later* in the replication packet.

2.6. Holistic assessment of replication results

Given the complexity of replication results and the plethora of criteria with which to evaluate them (see Brandt et al., 2014; Simonsohn, 2015), we close with a holistic assessment of the results of this first Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) initiative (see also the final column of Table 1).

Six out of ten of the original findings replicated quite robustly across laboratories: the *bigot-misanthrope effect*, *belief-act inconsistency effect*, *cold-hearted prosociality*, *moral cliff effect*, *burn in hell effect*, and *intuitive economics effect*. For these original findings the aggregated replication effect size was 1) in the same direction as in the original study, 2) statistically significant after meta-analyzing across all replications, 3) significant after meta-analyzing across both the original and replication effect sizes, 4) not significantly different from the original effect size, and 5) large enough to have been reliably detected in the original study (“small telescopes” criterion; Simonsohn, 2015).

The *bad tipper effect* likewise replicated according to the above criteria, but with some evidence of moderation by national culture. According to the frequentist criteria of statistical significance, the effect replicated consistently in the United States, but not in international samples. This could be due to cultural differences in norms related to tipping. It is noteworthy however that in the Bayesian analyses, almost all replication Bayes factors favor the original hypothesis, suggesting there is a true effect.

The *moral inversion effect* is another interesting case. This effect was statistically significant in both the original and replication studies. However, the replication effect was smaller and with a confidence interval that did not include the original effect size, suggesting the original study overestimated the true effect. Yet despite this, the moral inversion effect passed the small telescopes criterion (Simonsohn, 2015): the aggregated replication effect was large enough to have been reliably detected in the original study. The original study therefore provided evidence for the hypothesis that was unlikely to be mere statistical noise. Overall, we consider the moral inversion effect supported by the crowdsourced replication initiative.

In contrast, two findings failed to consistently replicate the same pattern of results found in the original study (*higher standards* and *presumption of guilt*). We consider the original theoretical predictions not supported by the large-scale PPIR project. These studies were re-run in qualified labs using subject populations predicted a priori by the original authors to exhibit the hypothesized effects, and failed to replicate in high-powered research designs that allowed for much more accurate effect size estimates than in the original studies. Notably, both of these original studies found null effects; the crowdsourced replications revealed true effect sizes that were both significantly different from zero and two to five times larger than in the original investigations. Replication Bayes factors for the higher standards effect suggest the original finding is simply not true, whereas results for the presumption of guilt hypothesis are ambiguous, suggesting the evidence is not compelling either way.

As noted earlier, the original effects examined in the Pipeline Project fell into three broad categories: person-centered morality, moral perceptions of market factors, and the psychology of corporate reputation. These three broad categories of effects received differential support from the results of the crowdsourced replication initiative. Robust support for predictions based on the person-centered account of moral judgment (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Uhlmann et al., 2015) was obtained across six original findings. The replication results also supported predictions regarding moral coherence (Liu & Ditto, 2013; Clark et al., in press) in perceptions of economic variables, but did not find consistent support for two specific hypotheses concerning moral judgments of organizations. Thus, the PPIR process allowed categories of robust effects to be separated from categories of findings that were less robust. Although speculative, it may be the case that programmatic research supported by many conceptual replications is more likely to directly replicate than stand-alone findings (Schaller, in press).

3. Discussion

The present crowdsourced project introduces Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR), a method for improving the reproducibility of scientific research in which findings are replicated in qualified independent laboratories before (rather than after) they are published. PPIRs are high in informational value (Nelson, 2005; Nelson et al., 2010) because replication labs are chosen by the original author based on their expertise and access to relevant subject populations. Thus, common alternative explanations for failures to replicate are eliminated, and the replication results are especially diagnostic of the validity of the original claims.

The Pre-Publication Independent Replication approach is a practical method to improve the rigor and replicability of the published literature that complements the currently prevalent approach of replicating findings after the original work has been already published (Ebersole et al., in press; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). The PPIR method increases transparency and ensures that what appears in our journals has already been independently validated. PPIR avoids the cluttering of journal archives by original articles and replication reports that are separated in time, and even publication outlets, without any formal links to one another. It also avoids the adversarial interactions that sometimes occur between original authors and replicators (see

¹ In a fixed-effects model – i.e. without accounting for between study variability in the computation of the standard error – the bad tipper effect is significantly different from zero in non-USA samples as well.

Bohannon, 2014; Kahneman, 2014; Lieberman, 2014; Schnall, 2014a,b,c; Wilson, 2014). In sum, the PPIR approach represents a powerful example of how to conduct a reliable and effective science that fosters capitalization rather than self-correction.

To illustrate the PPIR approach, 25 research groups conducted replications of all moral judgment effects which the last author and his collaborators had “in the pipeline” as of August 2014. Six of the ten original findings replicated robustly across laboratories. At the same time, four of the original findings failed at least one important replication criterion (Brandt et al., 2014; Schaller, in press; Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014)— either because the effect only replicated significantly in the original culture (one study), because the replication effect was significantly smaller than in the original (one study), because the original finding consistently failed to replicate according to frequentist criteria (two studies), or because the replication Bayes factor disfavored the original finding (one study) or revealed mixed results (one study).

3.1. Moderate replication rates should be expected

The overall replication rate in the Pipeline Project was higher than in the Reproducibility Project (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), in which 36% of 100 original studies were successfully replicated at the $p < .05$ level. (Notably, 47% of the original effect sizes fell within the 95% confidence interval of the replication effect size). However, the two crowdsourced replication projects are not directly comparable, since the Reproducibility Project featured single-shot replications from individual laboratories and the Pipeline Project pooled the results of multiple labs, leading to greater statistical power to detect small effects. As seen in Fig. 1, the individual labs in the Pipeline Project often failed to replicate original findings that proved reliable when the results of multiple replication sites were combined. In addition, the moral judgment findings in the Pipeline Project required less expertise to carry out than some of the original findings featured in the Reproducibility Project, which likely also improved our replication rate.

A more relevant comparison is the Many Labs projects, which pioneered the use of multiple laboratories to replicate the same findings. Our replication rate of 60%–80% was comparable to the Many Labs 1 project, in which eleven out of thirteen effects replicated across 36 laboratories (Klein et al., 2014). However it was higher than in Many Labs 3, in which only 30% of ten original studies replicated across 20 laboratories (Ebersole et al., in press). Importantly, both original studies from our Pipeline Project that failed to replicate (*higher standard* and *presumption of guilt*), as well as the studies which replicated with highly variable results across cultures (*bad tipper*) or obtained a smaller replication effect size than the original (*moral inversion*) featured open data and materials. They also featured no use of questionable research practices such as optional stopping, failing to report all dependent measures, or removal of subjects, conditions, and outliers (Simmons et al., 2011). This underscores the fact that studies will often fail to replicate for reasons having nothing to do with scientific fraud or questionable research practices.

It is important to remember that null hypothesis significance testing establishes a relatively low threshold of evidence. Thus, many effects that were supported in the original study *should not* find statistical support in replication studies (Stanley & Spence, 2014), especially if the original study was underpowered (Cumming, 2008; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013) and the replication relied on participants from a different culture or demographic group who may have interpreted the materials differently (Fabrigar & Wegener, in press; Stroebe, in press). In the present crowdsourced PPIR investigation, the replication rate was imperfect despite original studies that were conducted transparently and re-examined by qualified replicators. It may be expecting too much for an effect obtained in one laboratory and subject population to automatically replicate in any other laboratory and subject population.

Increasing sample sizes dramatically (for instance, to 200 subjects per cell) reduces both Type 1 and Type 2 errors by increasing statistical power, but may not be logistically or economically feasible for many research laboratories (Schaller, in press). Researchers could instead run initial studies with moderate sample sizes (for instance, 50 subjects per condition in the case of an experimental study; Simmons et al., 2013), conduct similarly powered self-replications, and then explore the generality and boundary conditions of the effect in large-sample crowdsourced PPIR projects. This is a variation of the *Explore Small, Confirm Big* strategy proposed by Sakaluk (in press).

It may also be useful to consider a Bayesian framework for evaluating replication results. Instead of forcing a yes-no decision based on statistical significance, in which nonsignificant results are interpreted as failures to replicate, a replication Bayes factor allows us to assess the degree to which the evidence supports the original effect or the null hypothesis (Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014).

3.2. Limitations and challenges of Pre-Publication Independent Replication

It is important to also consider disadvantages of seeking to independently replicate findings prior to publication. Although more collegial and collaborative than replications of published findings (Bohannon, 2014), PPIRs do not speak to the reproducibility of classic and widely influential findings in the field, as is the case for instance with the Many Labs investigations (Ebersole et al., in press; Klein et al., 2014). Rather, PPIRs can help scholars ensure the validity and reproducibility of their emerging research streams. The benefit of PPIR is perhaps clearest in the case of “hot” new findings celebrated at conferences and likely headed toward publication in high-profile journals and widespread media coverage. In these cases, there is enormous benefit to ensuring the reliability of the work before it becomes common knowledge among the general public. Correcting unreliable, but widely disseminated, findings post-publication (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012) is much more difficult than systematically replicating new findings in independent laboratories before they appear in print (Schooler, 2014).

Critics have suggested that effect sizes in replications of already published work may be biased downward by lack of replicator expertise, use of replication samples where the original effect would not be theoretically expected to emerge (at least without further pre-testing), and confirmation bias on the part of skeptical replicators (Lieberman, 2014; Schnall, 2014a/b/c; Schwarz & Strack, 2014; Stroebe & Strack, 2014; Wilson, 2014). PPIR explicitly recruits expert partner laboratories with relevant participant populations and is less subject to these concerns. However, PPIRs could potentially suffer from the reverse problem, in other words estimated effect sizes that are *upwardly* biased. In a PPIR, replicators likely begin with the hope of confirming the original findings, especially if they are co-authors on the same research report or are part of the same social network as the original authors. But at the same time, the replication analyses are pre-registered, which dramatically reduces researcher degrees of freedom to drop dependent measures, strategically remove outliers, selectively report studies, and so forth. The replication datasets are further publicly posted on the internet. It is difficult to see how a replicator could artificially bias the result in favor of the original finding without committing outright fraud. The incentive to confirm the original finding in the PPIR may simply lead replicators to treat the study with the same care and professionalism that they would their own original work.

The respective strengths and weaknesses of PPIRs and replications of already published work can effectively balance one another. Initiatives such as Many Labs and the Reproducibility Project speak to the reliability of already well-known and influential research; PPIRs provide a

² We thank Raphael Silberzahn for suggesting this approach to implementing PPIRs.

870 check against findings becoming too well-known and influential pre-
871 maturely, before they are established as reliable.

872 Both existing replication methods (Klein et al., 2014) and PPIRs are
873 best suited to simple studies that do not require very high levels of ex-
874 pertise to carry out, such as those in the present Pipeline Project.
875 Many original findings suffer from a limited pool of qualified experts
876 able and willing to replicate them. In addition, studies that involve sen-
877 sitive manipulations can fail even in the hands of experts. For such stud-
878 ies, the informational value of null effects will generally be lower than
879 positive effects, since null effects could be either due to an incorrect hy-
880 pothesis or some aspect of the study not being executed correctly
881 (Mitchell, 2014). Thus, although replication failures in the Pipeline Pro-
882 ject have high informational value, not all future PPIRs will be so diag-
883 nostic of scientific truth.

884 Finally, it would be logistically challenging to implement pre-
885 publication independent replication as a routine method for every
886 paper in a researcher's pipeline. The number of new original findings
887 emerging will invariably outweigh the PPIR opportunities. In practice,
888 some lower-profile findings will face difficulties attracting replicator
889 laboratories to carry out PPIRs. Researchers may pursue PPIRs for pro-
890 jects they consider particularly important and likely to be influential,
891 or that have policy implications. We discuss potential ways to incentiv-
892 ize and integrate PPIRs into the current publication system below.

893 3.3. Implementing and Incentivizing PPIRs

894 Rather than advocate for mandatory independent replication prior
895 to publication, we suggest that the improved credibility of findings
896 that are independently replicated will constitute an increasingly impor-
897 tant quality signal in the coming years. As a field we can establish a pre-
898 mium for research that has been independently replicated prior to
899 publication through favorable reviews and editorial decisions. Replicators
900 can either be acknowledged formally as authors (with their role in the project
901 made explicit in the author contribution statement) or a separate replication
902 report can be submitted and published alongside the original paper. Research
903 groups can also engage in "study swaps" in which they replicate each other's
904 ongoing work.

905 Organizing independent replications across partner universities can
906 be an arduous and time-consuming endeavor. Researchers with limited
907 resources need a way to independently confirm the reliability of their
908 work. To facilitate more widespread implementation of PPIRs, we plan
909 to create a website where original authors can nominate their findings
910 for PPIRs and post their study materials. Graduate methods classes all
911 over the world will then adopt these for PPIR projects and the results
912 will be published as the Pipeline Project 2 with the original researchers
913 and replicators as co-authors. Additional information obtained from the
914 replications (such as more precise measures of effect size, narrower
915 confidence intervals, etc.) can then be incorporated into the final publi-
916 cations by the original authors with the replicators thanked in the ac-
917 knowledgments. Obviously this approach is best suited to simple
918 studies that require little expertise, such that a first-year graduate stu-
919 dent can easily run the replications.

920 For original studies requiring high expertise and/or specialized
921 equipment, one can envision a large online pool of interested laborato-
922 ries, with expertise and resources publicly listed. The logic is similar to
923 that of a temporary internet labor market, in which employers and
924 workers in different parts of the world post profiles and find suitable
925 matches through a bidding process. A similar "collaborator commons"
926 for open science projects could be used to match original laboratories
927 seeking to have their work replicated with qualified experts.² Leverag-
928 ing such an approach, even studies that require a great deal of expertise
929 could be replicated independently prior to publication, so long as a suit-
930 able partner lab elsewhere in the world can be identified. The Many Lab
931 website for online collaborations recently introduced by the Open Sci-
932 ence Center (Ebersole, Klein, & Atherton, 2014) already provides the be-
933 ginnings of such a system.

934 An online marketplace in which researchers offer up particular find-
935 ings for replication can also help determine the interest and importance
936 of the finding. Few will volunteer to help replicate an effect that is not
937 interesting or novel. Thus a marketplace approach can not only help se-
938 lect out effects that are not reliable before publication, but also those
939 that are less likely to capture broad interest from other researchers
940 who study the same topic.

941 A challenge for pre-publication independent replication is credit and
942 authorship. It is standard practice on crowdsourced replication projects
943 to include replicators as co-authors (e.g., Alogna et al., 2014; Ebersole
944 et al., in press; Klein et al., 2014; Lai et al., 2014); we know of no excep-
945 tion to this principle. As with any large-scale collaborative project, au-
946 thor contributions are typically more limited than a traditional
947 research publication, but this is proportional to the credit received—
948 54th author will gain no one an academic position or tenure promotion.
949 Yet many colleagues still choose to take part, and large crowdsourced
950 projects with long author strings have become increasingly common
951 in recent years. This "many authors" approach is critical to the viability
952 of crowdsourced research as a means to improve the rigor and replica-
953 bility of our science. However, an extended author string can make it
954 difficult to distinguish the relative contributions of different project
955 members. Detailed author contribution statements are critical to clarify-
956 ing each person's respective project roles.

957 3.4. Integrating PPIRs and Cross-Cultural Research

958 Cross-cultural research bears important similarities with PPIRs, in
959 that original studies are repeated in new populations by partner labora-
960 tories. Most research investigations unfortunately do not include cross-
961 cultural comparisons (Henrich et al., 2010), leaving it an open question
962 whether the observed phenomenon is similar or different outside the
963 culture in which the research was originally done. It is worth consider-
964 ing how PPIRs and cross-cultural research can be better integrated to es-
965 tablish either the generalizability or cultural boundaries of a
966 phenomenon.

967 Based on the theorizing underlying the ten effects selected for the
968 Pipeline project, the original findings should have replicated consistent-
969 ly across laboratories. No cultural differences were hypothesized be-
970 forehand, yet such differences did emerge. For instance, a number of
971 effects were significantly smaller outside of the original culture of the
972 United States. We suggest that researchers conducting PPIRs include
973 any anticipated moderation by replication location in their pre-
974 registration plan (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). This allows for tests of a
975 priori predictions regarding the cultural variability of a phenomenon.
976 In cases such as ours in which the results point to unanticipated cultural
977 differences, we suggest the investigators follow up with further confir-
978 matory replications.

979 More ambitiously, large globally distributed PPIR initiatives could
980 adopt a *replication chain* approach to probe the generalizability vs. cul-
981 tural boundaries of an effect as efficiently as possible (see Hüffmeier,
982 Mazei & Schultze, in press, and Kahneman, 2012, for complementary
983 perspectives on how sequences of replications can inform theory and
984 practice). In a replication chain, each original effect is first replicated
985 in partner laboratories with subject populations as similar as possible
986 to the original one. For instance, if a researcher at the University of
987 Washington believes she has identified a reliable effect among UW un-
988 dergraduates, the effect is first replicated at the University of Oregon
989 and then other institutions in the United States. Only findings that re-
990 plicate reliably within their original culture would then qualify for inter-
991 national replications at partner institutions in China, France, Singapore,
992 and so on. There is little sense in expending limited resources on effects
993 that do not consistently replicate even in similar subject populations.

994 Once an effect is established as reliable in its culture of origin, claims
995 of cross-cultural universality can be put to a rigorous test by deliberately
996 selecting the available replication sample *as different as possible* from the
997 original subject population (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). For instance, if

a researcher at Princeton predicts that she has identified a universal judgmental bias, laboratories in non-Western cultures with access to less educated subject populations should be engaged for the PPIRs. A successful field replication (Maner, in press) among fishing net weavers in a rural village in China provides critical evidence of universality; a successful replication at Harvard adds very little evidence in support of this particular claim.

Alternatively, crowdsourced PPIR initiatives could coordinate laboratories to systematically test cultural moderators hypothesized a priori by the original authors (Henrich et al., 2010). Once the finding is established as reliable in its original culture, the authors select a specific culture or cultures for the replications in which the effect is expected to be absent or reverse on a priori grounds (e.g., Eastern vs. Western cultures; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Systematic tests across multiple universities in each culture then provide a safeguard against the nonrepresentative samples at each institution, which could confound comparisons if just one student population from each culture is used.

4. Conclusion

Pre-Publication Independent Replication is a collaborative approach to improving research quality in which original authors nominate their own unpublished findings and select expert laboratories to replicate their work. The aim is a replication process free of acrimony and final results high in scientific truth value. We illustrate the PPIR approach through crowdsourced replications of the last author's research pipeline, revealing the mix of robust, qualified, and culturally-variable effects that are to be expected when original studies and replications are conducted transparently. Integrating pre-publication independent replication into our research streams holds enormous potential for building connections between colleagues and increasing the robustness and reliability of scientific knowledge, whether in psychology or in other disciplines.

Author contributions

The first, second, and last authors contributed equally to the project. Eric Luis Uhlmann designed the Pipeline Project and wrote the initial project proposal. Martin Schweinsberg, Nikhil Madan, Michelangelo Vianello, Amy Sommer, Jennifer Jordan, Warren Tierney, Eli Awtrey, and Luke (Lei) Zhu served as project coordinators. Daniel Diermeier, Justin Heinze, Malavika Srinivasan, David Tannenbaum, Eric Luis Uhlmann, and Luke Zhu contributed original studies for replication. Michelangelo Vianello, Jennifer Jordan, Amy Sommer, Eli Awtrey, Eliza Bivolaru, Jason Dana, Clinton P. Davis-Stober, Christilene Du Plessis, Quentin F. Gronau, Andrew C. Hafenbrack, Eko Yi Liao, Alexander Ly, Maarten Marsman, Toshio Murase, Israr Qureshi, Michael Schaerer, Nico Thornley, Christina M. Tworek, Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, and Lynn Wong helped analyze the data. Eli Awtrey, Jennifer Jordan, Amy Sommer, Tabitha Anderson, Christopher W. Bauman, Wendy L. Bedwell, Victoria Brescoll, Andrew Canavan, Jesse J. Chandler, Erik Cheries, Sapna Cheryan, Felix Cheung, Andrei Cimpian, Mark Clark, Diana Cordon, Fiery Cushman, Peter Ditto, Thomas Donahue, Sarah E. Frick, Monica Gamez-Djokic, Rebecca Hofstein Grady, Jesse Graham, Jun Gu, Adam Hahn, Brittany E. Hanson, Nicole J. Hartwich, Kristie Hein, Yoel Inbar, Lily Jiang, Tehlyr Kellogg, Deanna M. Kennedy, Nicole Legate, Timo P. Luoma, Heidi Maibeuchner, Peter Meindl, Jennifer Miles, Alexandra Mislin, Daniel Molden, Matt Motyl, George Newman, Hoai Huong Ngo, Harvey Packham, Philip S. Ramsay, Jennifer Lauren Ray, Aaron Sackett, Anne-Laure Sellier, Tatiana Sokolova, Walter Sowden, Daniel Storage, Xiaomin Sun, Christina M. Tworek, Jay Van Bavel, Anthony N. Washburn, Cong Wei, Erik Wetter, and Carlos Wilson carried out the replications. Adam Hahn, Nicole Hartwich, Timo Luoma, Hoai Huong Ngo, and Sophie-Charlotte Darroux translated study materials from English into the local language. Eric Luis Uhlmann and Martin Schweinsberg wrote the

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Uncited references

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Appendix A. Supplementary data

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