Was Accounting a Root Cause of the Global Financial Crisis?¹

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Abstract

Financial reporting served as a root cause of global financial crisis through: (1) specific pro-cyclical accounting rules such as mark-to-market valuation and loan loss recognition at incurrence; and (2) excessive codification and elimination of “true and fair override” which rendered it a victim to financial engineering. A better balance between common law and statutory approaches to financial reporting may help us alleviate such problems.

Corporate governance is closely intertwined with various aspects of accounting—financial reporting, managerial control, compensation, internal and external audits, and taxation. It is often difficult to isolate governance from control, and fascinating to explore their interactions.

Financial reporting was indeed a root cause of the global financial crisis for two reasons. First, specific financial reporting standards such as (1) mark-to-market valuation in the comforting but guise of “fair values,” and (2) delay in recognition of bad debts until loss is incurred, helped distort information and investment decisions, and contributed to market failures. The role of financial reporting is to provide information for the markets so investors can independently value the securities, and not merely prepare financial reports from the market price of the securities.

Second, excessive dependence on written standards to the exclusion of “true and fair” override based on global judgment created a spiral of interplay between financial reporting and financial engineering. This spiral ensured that the intents of any written financial standards could be defeated by financial engineers through redesign of instruments, transactions, and organizations. This spiral fed the crisis, and contributed to the magnitude of its consequences.

Accounting and business community accepting greater responsibility for fairness of financial reports may help improve this situation. However, there are good reasons for

¹ This is a revised version of the plenary talk given at the Annual Meeting of International Corporate Governance Network, Toronto, Canada, June 7-9, 2010.
skepticism. We should not hold our breath for significant improvement in spite of all the promises of reforms in U.S. and the rest of the world. Just as a good democracy requires vigilant and responsible citizens, good corporate governance also is not possible without vigilant and responsible investors. ICGN plays a leadership role in this respect.

**Pro-Cyclicity of Mark-to-Market**

The pro-cyclic amplification of business cycle promoted by the mark-to-market accounting has been the best known argument in favor of affirmative answer to the question we are here to address. Most of the people who resisted the pro-cyclicity argument against mark-to-market accounting when we first made it early 2007, have come around three years later to recognize this problem. Mr. Turner, the Chairman of FSA in U.K. summarized it well in his January 2010 address to the Institute of Chartered Accountants in London:

When credit is extended in a securitized form, with the market price of credit clearly visible from trading in credit securities, there is an inherent risk that credit supply and pricing can be subject to self-reinforcing herd effects, with originators of and investors in credit treating the market level of credit and credit default swap spreads as indicators of credit risk and thus of appropriate credit pricing. (In the upswing this feeds the rising price of credit securities, falling spreads, increased origination, and a self-reinforcing willingness to invest in credit securities or indeed to lend on balance sheet.)

**Pro-Cyclicity of Loan Loss Recognition on Incurrence**

In addition to the pro-cyclical consequences of mark-to-market accounting for trading books, we should consider the pro-cyclical consequences of the current accounting rules for recognition of loan losses. Since these losses are recognized only when they are incurred, and not on an expected value basis, a downturn in business cycle brings recognition of large loan losses, lowering bank income as well as capital, which in turn lowers the availability of credit, further reinforcing the economic downturn. The reverse happens in economic upturns.

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However, beyond these well-known arguments for pro-cyclical effects of current accounting rules is a larger structural problem of accounting rules that has received little attention in regulatory, governance or academic circles.

Structure of Financial Reporting Rules and Institutions

The presumed objective of financial reporting is to help make various decisions, and define and implement contracts through specification of constraints on contracting parties. Since the introduction of federal securities laws in U.S. some eighty years ago, regulators and accountants have sought to achieve this end by moving away from what had originally been a common law construct called generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). During these eighty years, there has been a progressive shift towards a quasi-statutory regime of formal written standards issued with the enforcement power of regulatory authorities. Under the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board this process of transforming GAAP to a top-down prescription is almost complete; it no longer emerges bottom-up as a social norm of business practice. This gradual but radical shift from broad scope for professional judgment to progressive “clarification of rules” and “guidance” has been popular not only with the regulators and accountants but is also demanded by many in the business and financial communities. What, one might ask, is the source of complexity, and what is wrong with having clear written rules to deal with it?

Elephant in the Room—Financial Engineering

The reason is the accountants are not the only players in the arena of financial reporting; they have the formidable and adversarial company of financial engineers. Financial engineering consists of design, analysis, and construction of financial instruments, transactions and organizations to meet the needs of the enterprise. These “needs” consist of goals like reducing indebtedness on the balance sheet and expense on the income statement, increasing revenue on the income statement, deductions on tax returns, and regulatory capital on bank balance sheet. Financial reporting and engineering have diametrically opposed goals.

Financial reporting has no chance of winning this unequal battle. It may take a few years for the FASB or IASB to make its policy in form of a rule on an accounting issue (unless it is under pressure from U.S. Congress or a Gallic politician, in which case years are compressed
into days). It take a mere hours or days for the financial engineer to circumvent the new accounting rules intended to put constraints on managers.

While accountants are limited to doing the accounting for transactions chosen by the managers, the latter are free to devise the transactions, instruments, and even organizations (recall Enron’s three thousand special purpose entities) to circumvent the intent of the financial accounting rules. History of leases and various kinds of financial derivatives and securitization provides a wealth of evidence.3

Financial engineering is the elephant in the room of financial reporting that nobody is willing to admit is present. Yet, financial engineering has played a critical role not only in defeating the intent of financial accounting rules, but also pushing the rules towards increasing detail in fruitless attempts to plug the holes. Ironically, the more specific the rules get, the easier is the job of the financial engineer because specificity reduces uncertainty about violating the rules.

The current structure, by relying on top-down financial reporting standards, falls in to this trap. It replaces accountant’s judgment by increasing detail under the guise of “clarification” or “guidance”. Even IASB’s so-called principles now cover some 3,000 pages—something unheard of in other learned professions where judgment dominates written rules.

What Can We Do?

Use Effective Yield Rate to Estimate Loan Loss Reserves

I have two specific suggestions for dealing with these problems. On pro-cyclicality with respect to loan loss accounting on bank books, accountants can use the information on default risk associated with individual loans contained in the yield rate on the loans themselves since this yield is negotiated in an arms-length transaction. For example, if a loan has a yield of 8 percent at a time when the risk-free rate on loans of comparable term is 5 percent, the difference of 3 percent is a reasonable estimate of the default risk. This estimated default risk can and should be

3 Audience responses (in parantheses) to instant polling support the idea. No matter how you write the rules of accounting or corporate governance, management can always circumvent them: Yes (59%); No (7%); only some times (33%); not sure (1%).
used to recognize expected loan losses at the time of issue and subsequently. This process will make sure that the loan loss reserve is set up to match the magnitude of risk the bank has taken in giving the loan to a client. This is not a device to artificially smooth the income over multiple cycles, as some have suggested.

**Balancing Statutory and Common Law Approaches in Financial Reporting**

On the structural problem (of the move from common law to quasi-statutory concept of GAAP), we could seek a middle ground. Just as lawyers balance these two approaches without getting trapped in either end, financial reporting also could benefit from striving for a better balance. Unfortunately, regulatory monopolies granted to national or international boards in most jurisdictions can hardly be expected to strive for such a balance. Limited supervised competition among two or standard setters might do better. In spite of frequent arguments about race to the bottom in such a competition, there is plenty of evidence from various domains (state charters of corporations, universities, environment, etc.) that this fear is misplaced. In a competitive mode, standard setters may rediscover that evolution with trial-and-error experimentation, and “true and fair” over ride of rules based on judgment will limit complexity, improve financial reporting and help it withstand incessant pressure of financial engineering. The mantra of single set of high quality principles-based accounting standards for comparability across the whole world has been repeated often. Yet, even accountants deny that the application of IFRS across member countries of the European Union is uniform.4

**Governance is Not a New Problem**

Attempts to design an effective corporate governance and accounting and control system for one of the British East India Company started almost as soon as it was chartered in 1601. Over its 258 year history, the company made continual efforts to implement an effective system of corporate control with only sporadic success. Figure 1 is a sketch of the greatest corporate

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4Audience responses (in parantheses) support the idea. Route to truthful and fair financial reporting is: allow less room for managerial judgment (21%); allow more room for managerial judgment (21%); develop a better sense of responsibility to society among managers (30%); stronger link from corporate performance to managerial compensation (19%); and not sure (9%). Granting a world-wide monopoly in setting accounting standards to a single organization will lead to: better financial reporting and investment decisions (35%); potential bureaucratization of accounting standards (34%); make it difficult to experiment with and evaluate alternative standards (26%); and not sure (5%).

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governance trial in the history at the Westminster Hall in London 222 years ago. Society ladies would dress up in their best and flock to listen to the oratory of Edmund Burke who had been appointed by Parliament as the prosecutor of Warren Hastings. On his return from India, he had been indicted for failures of governance. The trial went on for more than seven years until just about everyone got tired, and Hastings was not convicted.

Attempts to devise better corporate governance mechanisms are as old as human civilization. In the fourth century BCE, Kautilya wrote in his Sanskrit classic on economics and administration: Just as it is difficult for one to know if a fish swimming in water is also drinking it, it is difficult to know if the king’s officers partake of the state’s wealth for personal advantage (2.9.33). If no list of check-boxes devised and peddled by accountants, consultants, lawyers, or legislators solve the problem of corporate governance, at least we can take comfort in the thought that hundreds of generations before us have tried to solve the problem, with only mixed success.
Westminster Hall: Trial of Warren Hastings
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