{"id":12,"date":"2018-12-14T20:35:17","date_gmt":"2018-12-14T20:35:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/faculty.som.yale.edu\/barrynalebuff\/?page_id=12"},"modified":"2025-02-12T15:33:45","modified_gmt":"2025-02-12T15:33:45","slug":"articles","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/faculty.som.yale.edu\/barrynalebuff\/articles\/","title":{"rendered":"Articles"},"content":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]<\/p>\n

“Symmetry and the Sixth Force: The Essential Role of Complements,”<\/a> CPI Antitrust Chronicle<\/em>, November 2024, (with Adam Brandenburger).<\/p>\n

“Rethinking Negotiation: A Smarter Way to Split the Pie,”<\/a>\u00a0Harvard Business Review,\u00a0<\/em>November-December 2021, (with Adam Brandenburger).<\/p>\n

“The Rules of Co-opetition”<\/a>, Harvard Business Review,<\/em> January-February 2021, (with Adam Brandenburger).<\/p>\n

“Measuring competitive balance in sports,”<\/a>\u00a0Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports<\/em>, September 2020, (with Matthew Doria).<\/p>\n

“A Perspective-Invariant Approach to Nash Bargaining<\/a>,” Management Science, <\/em>pp. 1-27, June 2020.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Welfare Effects of Metering Ties,\u201d <\/a>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization<\/em>, October 2016 (with Einer Elhauge).<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Rule of Probabilities,\u201d <\/a>Stanford Law Review<\/em>, June 2015 (with Ian Ayres).<\/p>\n

“Diversification Across Time<\/a>” Journal of Portfolio Management<\/em>, Winter 2013 (with Ian Ayres).<\/p>\n

“Competing Complements,<\/a>” Harvard Business School, (with Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and David Yoffie).<\/p>\n

\u201cPrice Discrimination and Welfare,\u201d<\/a> Competition Policy International<\/em> 5, no. 2 (2009): 221\u2013241.<\/p>\n

\u201cHome Equity Insurance: A Pilot Project,\u201d in\u00a0Housing Markets and the Economy: Risk, Regulation, and Policy<\/em>, edited by E. Glaeser and J. Quigley, 39\u201382. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2009 (with Andrew Caplin, et al.). Working paper version here<\/a>.<\/p>\n

“Unfit to be Tied: An Analysis of Trident v Independent Ink<\/em> (2006),”<\/a>in The Antitrust Revolution<\/em>, 5th edition, edited by J. Kwoka and L. White, 365\u201388. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.<\/p>\n

\u201cBundling and Antitrust,\u201d in Issues in Competition Law and Policy<\/em>, edited by D. Collins, 1881\u20131910. Washington, DC: ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2008.<\/p>\n

\u201cBundling and Tying,\u201d in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, edited by S. Durlauf and L. Blume. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.<\/p>\n

Supreme Court Amici Curiae in support of Independent Ink, Inc. in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,<\/a> 2005 (with Ian Ayres and Lawrence Sullivan).<\/p>\n

\u201cExclusionary Bundling,\u201d<\/a> The Antitrust Bulletin<\/em> 50, no. 3 (2005): 321\u2013370.<\/p>\n

\u201cGoing Soft on Microsoft? The EU’s Antitrust Case and Remedy,\u201d<\/a> The Economists\u2019 Voice<\/em> 2, no. 2 (2005): Article 4.<\/p>\n

\u201cTried and True Exclusion,\u201d<\/a> Competition Policy International<\/em> 1, no. 1 (2005): 41\u201353.<\/p>\n

\u201cEncouraging Suggestive Behavior,\u201d<\/a> Harvard Business Review<\/em>, December 2004 (with Ian Ayres).<\/p>\n

\u201cProduct Bundling in Communications Markets,\u201d a discussion with M. Del Blanco, R. Zastrow, and M. Lawrence-Apfelbaum. The Antitrust Source<\/em>, November 2004.<\/p>\n

“Negotiating the Deal”<\/a>(with F. George Davitt) in Selling Your Business: The Transition from Entrepreneur to Investor<\/em>, edited by L. Crosier, 55\u201380. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004.<\/p>\n

“Principled Problem Solving: Letting Constraints Filter and Guide Your Thinking Can Often Be the Best Way to reach Truly Creative Solutions,” <\/a>Scientific American Mind <\/em>96 (2004) (with Ian Ayres).<\/p>\n

\u201cVerifying the Solution from a Nonlinear Solver: A Case Study: Comment,\u201d<\/a> American Economic Review<\/em> 94, no. 1 (2004): 382\u201390 (with Ron Shachar).<\/p>\n

\u201cBundling as an Entry Barrier,\u201d<\/a> Quarterly Journal of Economics<\/em> 119, no. 1 (2004): 159\u2013188.<\/p>\n

\u201cIn Praise of Honest Pricing,\u201d<\/a> MIT Sloan Management Review<\/em> 45, no. 1 (2003): 24 (with Ian Ayres).<\/p>\n

\u201cBundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects \u2013 Conceptual Issues,\u201d<\/a> DTI Economics Paper No. 1, 2003.<\/p>\n

\u201cBundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects \u2013 Case Studies Issues,\u201d<\/a> DTI Economics Paper No. 1, 2003.<\/p>\n

\u201cBundling: GE-Honeywell (2001),\u201d<\/a> in The Antitrust Revolution,<\/em> 4th edition, edited by J. Kwoka and L. White, 388\u2013412. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Also in 5th edition, 2009, 416\u2013440.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Strategy of Bundling\u201d in The Many Facets of Leadership<\/em>, edited by M. Goldsmith, 293\u2013301. New York: FT Prentice Hall, 2003.<\/p>\n

\u201cThin Kin Gout, Oft\u2019 He Box\u201d<\/a> (with Ian Ayres) in Leading Authorities on Business: Winning Strategies from the Greatest Minds<\/em>, edited by M. Goldsmith and J. Belasco, 195\u2013201. Washington, DC: Leading Authorities Press, 2002.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Prisoners’ Dilemma,\u201d in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law<\/em>, edited by P. Newman. New York: St Martin’s Press, 2001.<\/p>\n

\u201cCompeting Against Bundles,\u201d<\/a> in Incentives, Organization, and Public Economics<\/em>, edited by P. Hammond and G. Myles. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.<\/p>\n

\u201cFollow the Leader: A Pivotal Voter Theory,\u201d<\/a> American Economic Review<\/em> 89, no. 3 (1999): 525\u2013547 (with Ron Shachar).<\/p>\n

\u201cComment on \u2018Incentive Reforms in Developing Country Bureaucracies: Lessons from Tax Administration,\u2019 by Dilip Mookherjee,\u201d in Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1997<\/em>, edited by B. Pleskovic and J. Stiglitz, 126\u2013131. The World Bank, 1998.<\/p>\n

\u201cCommon Knowledge as a Barrier to Negotiation,\u201d<\/a> UCLA Law Review<\/em>, August 1997, 1631\u201359 (with Ian Ayres).<\/p>\n

\u201cCompetition Among Institutions,\u201d<\/a> Journal of Economic Theory<\/em> 72, no. 1 (1997): 306\u2013342 (with Andrew Caplin).<\/p>\n

\u201cOn a Clear Day You Can See the Coase Theorem,\u201d in The Environment and Emerging Development Issues<\/em>, Vol. 1, edited by P. Dasgupta and K. M\u00e4ler, 35\u201347. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.<\/p>\n

\u201cInside Intel,\u201d<\/a> Harvard Business Review<\/em>, November\u2013December 1996, 168\u2013175 (with Adam Brandenburger).<\/p>\n

“The Rationally Shrinking Union”,<\/a> Economics and Politics<\/em> 8, no. 1 (1996): 51\u201360 (with Richard Sansing).<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Right Game: Use Game Theory to Shape Strategy,\u201d<\/a> Harvard Business Review<\/em> 73, no. 4 (1995): 57\u201371 (with Adam Brandenburger). Reprinted in Seeing Differently: Insights on Innovation<\/em>, edited by J. S. Brown. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997.<\/p>\n

\u201cAn Introduction to Vote Counting Schemes,\u201d<\/a> Journal of Economic Perspectives<\/em> 9, no. 1 (1995): 3\u201326 (with Jonathan Levin). Reprinted in Readings in Microeconomic Theory<\/em>, edited by M La Manna. London: The Dryden Press, 1997.<\/p>\n

\u201cGame Theory\u201d (with A. Dixit), and \u201cPrisoners’ Dilemma\u201d (with A. Dixit), in Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics<\/em>, edited by D. Henderson. New York: Warner Books, 1993.<\/p>\n

\u201cTo the Raider Goes the Surplus? A Reexamination of the Free-Rider Problem,\u201d<\/a> Journal of Economics and Management Strategy<\/em> 1, no.1 (1992): 37\u201362 (with Bengt Holmstrom).<\/p>\n

\u201cIndividuals and Institutions,\u201d<\/a> American Economic Review <\/em>82, no. 2 (1992): 317\u201322 (with Andrew Caplin).<\/p>\n

\u201cConservatism and Auditor-Client Negotiations,\u201d<\/a> Journal of Accounting Research<\/em> 29, Supplement (1991): 31\u201354 (with Rick Antle).<\/p>\n

\u201cMaking Strategies Credible\u201d (with A. Dixit) in Strategic Reflections on Human Behavior<\/em>, edited by R. Zeckhauser, 161\u2013184. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.<\/p>\n

\u201cRational Deterrence in an Imperfect World,\u201d<\/a> World Politics<\/em> 43, no. 2 (1991): 313\u2013335.<\/p>\n

\u201cAggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium,\u201d<\/a> Econometrica<\/em> 59, no. 1 (1991): 25\u201360 (with Andrew Caplin).<\/p>\n

\u201cAggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem,\u201d<\/a> Econometrica<\/em> 59, no. 1 (1991): 1\u201324 (with Andrew Caplin).<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Commitment to Seniority in Self-Governing Groups,\u201d<\/a> Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization<\/em> 6, Special Issue (1990): 45\u201372 (with Kenneth Shepsle).<\/p>\n

\u201cExcess Capacity, Efficiency, and Industrial Policy,\u201d in Managing Excess Capacity<\/em>, edited by C. Baden-Fuller, 45\u201358. London: Basil Blackwell, 1990 (with Pankaj Ghemawat).<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Devolution of Declining Industries,\u201d<\/a> Quarterly Journal of Economics<\/em> 105, no. 1 (1990): 167\u2013186 (with Pankaj Ghemawat).<\/p>\n

\u201cMinimal Nuclear Deterrence,\u201d<\/a> Journal of Conflict Resolution<\/em> 32, no. 3 (1988): 411\u2013425.<\/p>\n

\u201cIssues in the Application of Cost-Benefit Analysis to Energy Projects in Developing Countries,\u201d<\/a> Oxford Economic Papers<\/em> 39 (1987): 190\u2013122 (with Sudhir Anand). Reprinted in Prices, Quantities, and Expectations<\/em>, edited by P.J.N. Sinclair. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.<\/p>\n

\u201cOn 64%-Majority Rule,\u201d<\/a> Econometrica<\/em> 56, no. 4 (1988): 787\u2013815, (with Andrew Caplin).<\/p>\n

\u201cCredible Pretrial Negotiation,\u201d<\/a> Rand Journal of Economics<\/em> 18, no. 2 (1987): 198\u2013210.<\/p>\n

\u201cMulti-Dimensional Product Differentiation and Price Competition,\u201d<\/a> Oxford Economic Papers<\/em> 38, Supplement, (1986): 129\u2013146 (with Andrew Caplin). Reprinted in Strategic Behaviour and Industrial Competition<\/em>, edited by D. Morris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.<\/p>\n

\u201cBrinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation,\u201d<\/a> Conflict Management and Peace Science<\/em> 9, no. 2 (1986): 19\u201330.<\/p>\n

\u201cTesting in Models of Asymmetric Information,\u201d<\/a> Review of Economic Studies<\/em> 54, no. 2 (1987): 265\u2013279 (with David Scharfstein).<\/p>\n

\u201cPensions and the Retirement Decision\u201d (with Richard Zeckhauser) in Pensions, Labor, and Individual Choice<\/em>, edited by D. Wise, 283\u2013316. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985.<\/p>\n

\u201cExit,\u201d<\/a> Rand Journal of Economics<\/em> 16, no. 2 (1985): 184\u2013194 (with Pankaj Ghemawat).<\/p>\n

\u201cAsymmetric Equilibria in the War of Attrition,\u201d<\/a> Journal of Theoretical Biology<\/em> 113 (1985): 517\u2013527 (with John Riley).<\/p>\n

\u201cDragon-Slaying and Ballroom Dancing: The Private Supply of a Public Good,\u201d<\/a> Journal of Public Economics<\/em> 25 (1984): 1\u201312 (with Christopher Bliss).<\/p>\n

\u201cSome Aspects of Risk Sharing in Non-Classical Environments\u201d (with Hal Varian) in Social Insurance<\/em>, edited by L. Soderstrom, 1\u201319. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1983.<\/p>\n

\u201cPrizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition,\u201d<\/a> Bell Journal of Economics<\/em> 14, no. 1 (1983): 21\u201343 (with Joseph Stiglitz).<\/p>\n

\u201cInformation, Competition, and Markets,\u201d<\/a> American Economic Review<\/em> 73, no. 2 (1983): 278\u2013283 (with Joseph Stiglitz).[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row]<\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text] “Symmetry and the Sixth Force: The Essential Role of Complements,” CPI Antitrust Chronicle, November 2024, (with Adam Brandenburger). “Rethinking Negotiation: A Smarter Way to Split the Pie,”\u00a0Harvard Business Review,\u00a0November-December 2021, (with Adam Brandenburger). “The Rules of Co-opetition”, Harvard Business Review, January-February 2021, (with Adam Brandenburger). “Measuring competitive balance in sports,”\u00a0Journal of Quantitative Analysis in […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":3,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"_genesis_hide_title":false,"_genesis_hide_breadcrumbs":false,"_genesis_hide_singular_image":false,"_genesis_hide_footer_widgets":false,"_genesis_custom_body_class":"","_genesis_custom_post_class":"","_genesis_layout":"","footnotes":""},"class_list":{"0":"post-12","1":"page","2":"type-page","3":"status-publish","5":"entry"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/faculty.som.yale.edu\/barrynalebuff\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/12","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/faculty.som.yale.edu\/barrynalebuff\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/faculty.som.yale.edu\/barrynalebuff\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faculty.som.yale.edu\/barrynalebuff\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faculty.som.yale.edu\/barrynalebuff\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12"}],"version-history":[{"count":17,"href":"https:\/\/faculty.som.yale.edu\/barrynalebuff\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/12\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":146,"href":"https:\/\/faculty.som.yale.edu\/barrynalebuff\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/12\/revisions\/146"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/faculty.som.yale.edu\/barrynalebuff\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}